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MERIT VS. IDEOLOGY 
Michael J. Gerhardt* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In a provocative article, Stephen Choi of Boalt Hall Law School 
and Mitu Gulati of Georgetown University Law Center have suggested 
a tournament to determine the “best” judge in the United States.1  They 
have proposed objective data and criteria for measuring which circuit 
court judges are the best qualified candidates for appointment to the 
United States Supreme Court. 
Their project has been met with some skepticism in the legal 
academy.  Some legal scholars doubt whether merit can be objectively 
measured; some believe Choi and Gulati’s criteria for measuring merit 
are flawed; others believe that merit depends on, or at least includes 
several factors Choi and Gulati do not take into account; and some 
believe that Choi and Gulati fail to develop criteria that would allow for 
measuring the quality of a large number of other qualified people from 
federal district courts, state courts, academia, and public or 
governmental service. 
I call attention to Choi and Gulati’s project because I happen to 
like it.  In particular, it does at least three things absent from the vast 
majority of legal commentaries on judicial selection.  First, Choi and 
Gulati are willing to discuss merit.  They do not just focus on what has 
gone wrong with a particular nomination or with the confirmation 
process.  Their focus is not on what is ailing in the process but on what 
we might be able to find positive within it.  Second, they eschew labels.  
They refuse to play the popular game of pigeon-holing judges based on 
their supposed ideology, or pre-commitments, to certain outcomes or 
ways of thinking about constitutional issues, regardless of the facts of 
particular cases.2  They refuse to characterize candidates in extreme 
terms.  Their concern is with merit, plain and simple.  They propose 
 
 *  Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School; Visiting Fellow, James 
Madison Program in American Institutions and Ideals, Princeton University, Spring 2004. 
 1 Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 (2004). 
 2 See generally Should Ideology Matter: Judicial Nominations 2001: Hearings Before 
Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Hearings]. 
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criteria for measuring how well judges do their jobs.  Third, they dare to 
employ empirical analysis in assessing the quality of a particular 
judge’s performance on the bench.  Social scientists make their living 
employing and critiquing empirical analyses of public and private 
behavior, even in studying judicial selection, and some of these social 
scientists are highly critical of what they regard as the lack of rigor in 
legal scholars’ empirical analysis or their disdain for such analysis.3  
Empirical analysis is common to the fields of corporate law, securities, 
and law and economics; however, it is uncommon in legal scholarship 
assessing either judicial performance or the federal judicial selection 
process. 
In this essay, I will use each of three different factors that I believe 
distinguish Choi and Gulati’s project as lenses through which to discuss 
the apparent tension between merit and ideology in the federal judicial 
selection process, including the curious reluctance of many public 
officials and legal scholars to find an objective, or at least consensus-
building, measure of merit to guide critical assessment of judicial 
nominations.  I also illuminate the risks of trying to analyze the judicial 
selection process without taking into account each of the three factors. 
In Part I, I assess different possible definitions of merit that could 
be used for measuring judicial performance.  Examining these helps to 
illuminate the relationship between merit and ideology.  In Part II, I 
examine the benefits of eschewing the labeling of judicial nominees on 
the basis of their supposed ideologies.  Principal among these is that it 
frees us from the misleading and value-laden rhetoric commonly 
deployed for assessing judicial nominations.  Because of ideological 
drift and other factors, the categories most scholars and others use in 
analyzing judicial performance are not static.  In Part III, I address the 
challenges of constructing an empirical test for determining the relative 
impact of different factors on the fate of judicial nominations.  These 
challenges need to be met in order for us to move beyond the unfounded 
assumption that ideology significantly matters to outcomes in the 
confirmation process. 
 
I.     MERIT 
 
It is rare in symposia or other studies on judicial selection to talk at 
length about merit.  This reticence is surprising because it elides a basic 
question that presumably is of great interest to everyone concerned 
about the quality of judging: how do we measure fitness for office and 
 
 3 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002), 
available at http://polmeth.wustl.edu/papers/01/king02/pdf. 
  
2005] MERIT VS.  IDEOLOGY  355 
particularly how do we determine who is best qualified for appointment 
to the United States Supreme Court?  Before I discuss possible answers 
to this question, I consider briefly why legal academics and political 
leaders do not discuss merit in greater detail and with more candor than 
they do. 
 
A.      The Reticence on Merit 
 
It is unclear why we fail to discuss merit more than we do.  It is 
possible that when it comes to merit, we might all agree on more than 
what our leaders or academics typically acknowledge. It is possible, in 
other words, that we have greater consensus on merit than we know.  
Yet, if we have such consensus, it is unclear why it is not more 
prominent in discussions about, or debate within, the confirmation 
process.  If, however, we cannot agree on what constitutes merit, this 
may be because we implicitly acknowledge that factors besides merit 
may be more important to the choices of whom to nominate and 
confirm. 
Social scientists are largely, but by no means wholly, in agreement 
that merit is not pertinent to judicial selection.  On their view, judges do 
one of two things: they either vote their policy preferences directly4 or 
manipulate legal materials to maximize their policy or personal 
preferences.5  Hence, social scientists largely argue that judicial 
selection is based on ideology, a predisposition to certain constitutional 
commitments, regardless of the facts of particular cases.  As Harold 
Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal argue, the justices who are appointed reflect 
the values, or preferences, of the governing elite.6  Once on the bench, 
they become nothing more than policymakers who simply happen to 
wear robes. 
Imagining merit as distinct from ideology is no easy task.  Indeed, 
no one seriously thinks that President George W. Bush has been using 
the same criteria that President Clinton employed in choosing which 
people to nominate to district and circuit court judgeships.  Instead, we 
strongly suspect, based on leaks and outcomes that President Bush is 
considering different sets of judicial nominees than President Clinton 
did.  The differences in these nominees go beyond mere party 
affiliations or allegiances; they reflect differences in experience, 
political commitments and service, and attitudes about how to decide 
constitutional cases.  These attitudes are what some people might call 
 
 4 See, e.g., HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
 5 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). 
 6 See SPAETH & SEGAL, supra note 4. 
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ideological commitments. 
Yet, it is reasonable to wonder whether there are any selection 
criteria on which Presidents Bush and Clinton or their respective 
advisers would agree.  They apparently did agree on two nominees—
Judges Roger Gregory and Barrington Parker, Jr.—whom they 
nominated and who were ultimately confirmed by the Republican-led 
Senate in 2001.7  Presidents Clinton and Bush would each claim that 
they had nominated the “best qualified” people as federal judges, but 
such claims implicate the question of how do we determine merit, or 
who are the best qualified people for judicial appointments?  It is not 
immediately clear why or how both presidents could be appointing the 
best qualified people given that they appear to have been nominating 
quite different kinds of people to judgeships: people with different 
backgrounds, political experience, party affiliations, sponsors, and 
attitudes. 
Given these circumstances, the usual refrain from legal scholars is 
to insist that ideology matters, that it frequently makes the critical 
difference in whom the President nominates or whom the Senate 
confirms to Article III courts, and thus we need to focus on the likely 
ideologies of judicial nominees in evaluating whether they ought to be 
confirmed.  Walter Dellinger’s proposed solution to the impasse over 
some of President Bush’s judicial nominees has the distinct virtue of 
smoking out whether ideology is what matters most to each side.8  He 
proposes that each president agree to nominate at least one of a pre-
selected few people approved by the opposition party in exchange for a 
relatively smooth confirmation process for every three or four people he 
prefers to appoint to a particular circuit court of appeals.  For instance, 
in exchange for his getting Miguel Estrada, Bret Kavanaugh, and Tom 
Griffith appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia,9 President Bush would be obliged to nominate someone from 
a group of potential nominees approved by the Democratic caucus in the 
Senate.  If the President were to refuse, then, Dellinger argues, it can 
 
 7 In his final year in office, President Clinton nominated Roger Gregory and Barrington 
Parker, Jr. to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and for the Second Circuit, 
respectively.  The Senate never acted on those nominations.  Consequently, President Clinton in 
his last month in office designated both people as recess appointees to their respective courts of 
appeals.  These appointments would have expired at the end of the next congressional session.  In 
March of his first year in office, President George W. Bush announced his first set of nominees to 
the federal courts of appeals, including Gregory to the Fourth Circuit and Parker to the Second 
Circuit. 
 8 See Walter Dellinger, Broaden the Slate, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2003, at A23. 
 9 Estrada, Kavanaugh, and Griffith are three people on whose nominations by President 
Bush to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia the Senate never acted on.  
Democrats successfully blocked a floor vote on Estrada’s nomination, while the Judiciary 
Committee never acted on either Kavanaugh’s or Griffith’s nomination.  I do not know Estrada 
personally, but I do know both Kavanaugh and Griffith.  They have very kindly and generously 
given their time to lecture, more than once, to my classes. 
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only be because he clearly prefers not to compromise his prerogative to 
take ideology into account in nominating judges. 
Dellinger poses a powerful test of presidential commitment to 
ideological criteria for judicial nominations.  Nevertheless, it is possible 
that presidents may zealously protect their nominating authority—as 
did, for instance, Presidents Tyler and Madison in the 19th century10—
for reasons other than their desire to ensure the ideological purity of 
their judicial nominations.  Presidents may wish to preserve their 
autonomy to nominate people to judgeships for such other reasons as 
rewarding personal or party fealty, currying the favor of particular 
senators or constituencies, and broadening the diversity of the federal 
judiciary.  Of course, none of these reasons for appointment is mutually 
exclusive from fulfilling certain ideological criteria.  It is possible that 
presidents, or at least their advisers, might define merit as an additional 
criterion for nomination or perhaps the critical factor for choosing 
among potential nominees or for determining the potential sets of 
nominees for particular judgeships.  Indeed, some presidents, or their 
advisers, might define merit as including a particular ideological 
orientation with respect to constitutional interpretation.  It is not 
unprecedented by any means for presidents to select people as nominees 
based on the extent to which the nominees conform to the presidents’ 
notions as to the duties they expect judges or justices to perform.  
President Reagan, for instance, seems to have defined merit, at least in 
part, as including certain ideological commitments.11  He insisted that 
his staff and senators recommend candidates for judicial nominations 
that fit particular criteria, including a rigid commitment to original 
understanding in all cases.  Thus, merit may not be neatly severed from 
ideology.  It thus becomes necessary to examine different ways in 
which we can define merit and whether severing merit from ideology is 
possible, or in what ways, merit can be determined without any 
reference to ideology. 
 
B.     Imagining the Ideal Nominee 
 
Imagine, for a moment, you have been asked by the President to 
draft a list of qualifications for a nominee to the Supreme Court.  
Imagine further that you do not know which particular president has 
made this request.  You are behind the Rawlsean veil of ignorance12 as 
 
 10 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (rev. ed. 2003). 
 11 See Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: 
Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363 (2003). 
 12 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999). 
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to knowing anything particular about the President’s party or the 
composition of the Senate.  Is it possible to draft such a list, and if so, 
what would be on it? 
It is not hard to imagine that some criteria are bound to make the 
list, though reaching consensus on the activities that would satisfy them 
may be difficult.  First, we expect a nominee to have a high degree of 
legal acumen.  We expect the nominee to be highly intelligent, perhaps 
to have performed quite well in law school, maybe even to have 
attended an elite law school.  At the very least, we would want to make 
sure that the nominee has very sound legal skills; asks intelligent, 
probing questions; thinks clearly if not imaginatively about legal 
problems; identifies legal issues in a wide range of problems; is trained 
at problem-solving; and understands the special duties that she will be 
called upon to discharge. 
Second, we expect a nominee to have an excellent judicial 
temperament.  The ideal temperament for a justice is presumably to 
have the capacity to make decisions even-handedly, to be open-minded 
in listening to and considering the arguments in the cases that come 
before him, and to be respectful to litigants and other justices with 
differing opinions.  A judicial temperament requires, of course, a 
disposition to follow, rather than to rewrite, the law.  The nominee also 
needs to be able to handle the intense pressures that come with the 
responsibilities of a Supreme Court Justice. 
Collegiality is a third criterion for an ideal nominee to the Court.  
Collegiality requires getting along with the other justices.  It also entails 
being able to build coalitions and to maintain cordial relations with 
other justices, regardless of the extent to which one may agree or 
disagree with their views in particular cases.  Maintaining cordial 
relations is no easy feat on a Court once described by Justice Holmes as 
“nine scorpions in a bottle.”13  Not all people who must work together in 
relatively close quarters successfully maintain respect and civility over 
long periods of time, but the ideal nominee must have some such 
capability. 
The fourth criterion for the ideal nominee is excellent writing 
ability.  The ideal nominee should be able to write clear, coherent 
opinions.  It is especially important that the ideal nominee have the 
ability to craft opinions that reflect and can maintain the support of a 
majority of the justices in a given case.  Moreover, it is important for 
the nominee to be able to compose opinions relatively quickly given the 
time pressures under which justices operate. 
Fifth, significant and meaningful professional experience is 
indispensable to an ideal nominee to the Court.  This experience need 
 
 13 MAX LERNER, NINE SCORPIONS IN A BOTTLE: GREAT JUDGES AND CASES OF THE 
SUPREME COURT (1994). 
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not all have been in the public sector, but the more experience a 
nominee has first-hand with the legal system from top to bottom the 
better.  Meaningful experience might include serving in a significant 
public office, which might enrich the nominee’s understanding of the 
system from which the laws appealed to her Court will come.  Rich 
professional experience is bound to sharpen a nominee's judgments, and 
provide a solid foundation from which to approach the significant legal 
questions that come routinely before the Supreme Court. 
Sixth, integrity is essential to the ideal nominee.  A nominee’s 
integrity must be beyond question in order for her to be able to exercise 
the moral authority of a Supreme Court justice.  Justices embody the 
law, and they need to comply with the very laws they expect all others 
to follow. 
Closely related to nominees’ integrity is their character.  Stephen 
Carter and Larry Solum are just two of the many scholars who insist 
that a justice ought to have a strong, moral character.14  At the very 
least, having a strong, moral character means having the courage of 
one’s convictions and the strength not to alter one’s opinions, or decide 
cases, for the sake of currying peer or public esteem. 
There are other qualifications that ideal nominees might arguably 
need to satisfy.  Besides the factors already mentioned, presidents might 
also be interested in a nominee’s religion, ethnicity, gender, and health.  
These other factors might be important in diversifying the Court’s 
composition or satisfying under-represented segments of society.  
Moreover, the age of a nominee has been very important to presidents 
who wanted to ensure that their appointee could serve on the Court long 
after they had left office. 
Of course, the criteria that are relevant for determining ideal 
nominees are one thing, while the things which presidents or their 
advisers might consider in order to measure them are another.  The 
values of those charged with selecting a nominee will inevitably 
influence what they choose to look at and how they will perceive it.  
Moreover, it might simply be unrealistic—or dangerous—to ignore 
factors such as timing, the president’s party, the composition of the 
Senate, the nominee’s political or party affiliation, or the composition of 
the Court.  For instance, the composition of the Senate might be quite 
pertinent to a nominee’s chances for confirmation.  Indeed, a president 
might be inclined to choose different people, depending on whether his 
party controls the Senate or whether the minority has enough members 
to filibuster a contested nomination.  Certain factors are bound to 
complicate the nominating process.  For instance, the proximity of the 
 
 14 See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD’S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF 
RELIGION IN POLITICS, (2000); Lawrence Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology Versus Character, 
26 CARDOZO L. REV. 659 (2004). 
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next presidential election cannot be ignored, because the opposing party 
has successfully rejected or delayed more than a few Supreme Court 
nominees in the hopes of preserving the vacancies for presidents from 
their parties.15  And we have not yet mentioned a nominee’s likely 
ideology or how well a potential candidate interviews for the job as 
possible complicating factors. 
The large number of potential considerations helps to explain why 
some presidents, or their advisers, might prefer to break the nominating 
process into first- and second-order selection criteria.  The first might 
allow for a relatively sizeable list of potential candidates, while the 
second might be used to cut the list down to size, if not down to one.  
Interviews might be used to cut a narrowed list even further, at which 
point a great deal depends on the interviewer, the questions asked, and 
the nominees’ responses. 
It is possible that recognizing the large numbers of potential 
considerations discourages academics from pondering the qualifications 
of ideal nominees to the Court.  Academics might view such an exercise 
as futile, for they appreciate that Supreme Court nominees are not 
chosen in a vacuum.  Yet, neither senators nor academics hesitate to 
evaluate nominees on the basis of some criteria.  A question thus 
remains as to the appropriate criteria for measuring the quality of a 
particular nomination.  Of course, the fact that a nomination falls short 
of an ideal is not necessarily an argument against it.  A Supreme Court 
nominee usually enters the confirmation phase with at least a 
presumption, or likelihood, that he or she will be confirmed.16  It thus 
usually takes something rather significant—not just some deviation 
from an ideal—to put a nomination in trouble.  Nevertheless, the 
stronger a nominee’s credentials, or the more closely he or she 
approximates an ideal, the tougher it may be to undermine the 
nomination.  Thus, a look at another way in which to determine ideal 
credentials might be fruitful for providing at least one significant 
measure for evaluating the relative strengths of particular nominations. 
 
C.     Determining Merit in Reverse 
 
 The prior section examined possible selection criteria on which 
there might be consensus at the outset of a selection process.  This 
section considers determining qualifications by looking at merit in 
reverse; whether it is possible to infer from the justices we might 
generally agree were “great” or “excellent” what they might have had in 
 
 15 HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON (1999). 
 16 See GERHARDT, supra note 10, at 182. 
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common prior to their appointments.  The question is whether the signs 
of at least potential “greatness” or “excellence” were evident at the 
times of the appointments of those who later proved themselves to be 
first-rate justices. 
I will use two examples to illustrate this tack.  The first is the man 
for whom this Law Review takes its name: Justice Benjamin Cardozo.  
Justice Cardozo makes many, if not all, the lists of great justices, so the 
question naturally arises as to whether, or in what ways, this greatness 
was evident at the time of his nomination.  Throughout his career—first 
as a lawyer specializing in appellate briefs, then as a judge and later 
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Cardozo, nominally a 
Democrat, had enjoyed the confidence of all political factions.17  
Achieving this level of confidence was especially significant because he 
did it in an era when state courts and his court especially were widely 
revered.  He was also the author of several highly regarded books, and 
had received honorary degrees from many universities, including Yale, 
Columbia (his alma mater), and Harvard.  Many of his decisions in such 
areas as torts and contracts had influenced judges and courts throughout 
the nation.  Thus, he evidently had, by the time of his appointment, 
compiled ample judicial experience, shown considerable legal acumen, 
and demonstrated excellent judicial temperament, collegiality, and 
leadership on a prominent court.  His integrity and character were 
beyond reproach. 
My second example involves another New Yorker, Charles Evans 
Hughes, whom many believe was a first-rate jurist (not once but twice!).  
When Hughes was first nominated and confirmed to the Supreme Court 
in 1910, he already had outstanding credentials.18  He had been an 
active practitioner with one of the leading law firms in the country and a 
leader of the New York and national bars, and had devoted himself to 
substantial public service.  At the time President Taft appointed Hughes 
as an Associate Justice, Hughes was serving with distinction as the 
Governor of New York.  As an Associate Justice, Hughes authored a 
number of significant opinions and demonstrated respect for his 
colleagues and opposing arguments and had an even-handed 
temperament.  After leaving the Court six years later to run 
unsuccessfully for President of the United States, he served as President 
of the American Bar Association, argued several cases successfully 
before the Supreme Court, performed significant pro bono work, served 
for four years as secretary of state under Presidents Harding and 
Coolidge, and served on the Permanent Court of International Justice.  
Few nominees to the Court have matched his record of public service 
 
 17 See generally ANDREW KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998). 
 18 See Charles Evans Hughes, at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/justices/past 
justices/hughes.html. 
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prior to the Court, and fewer have had records of public service 
respected by the leaders of both parties, though this did not save him 
from having a significant minority of senators vote against his 
nomination as Chief Justice for fear of his allegiance to big business.  
Hughes brought statesmanship to the task of judging. 
My point is not to suggest that either Cardozo or Hughes ought to 
be viewed as the model appointee to the Court.  Rather, my point is that 
if we are sincerely interested in measuring merit we might be able to 
infer from their records, as of the respective times of these two widely 
respected jurists’ appointments, appropriate criteria for meritorious 
appointments to the Court.  It is, however, not clear that we can ever 
discuss merit without some reference to ideology.  Indeed, we know that 
most presidents and senators are preoccupied with ideology in assessing 
judicial nominees.  Consequently, we need to consider the implications 
of the linkage of merit to ideology in the federal judicial selection 
process. 
 
II.     THE BATTLE OVER THE MAINSTREAM IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
The reasons for the attraction, or dominance, of ideology in 
judicial selection are obvious.  First, national political leaders care about 
ideology because of the high stakes involved in judicial appointments.  
They understand that Article III judges enjoy life tenure and thus are 
immune from political retaliation against their decisions.  Judicial 
opinions on constitutional law cannot be overturned through ordinary 
legislation but only by a superior court or the Court itself, or through the 
extraordinary means of a constitutional amendment.  Consequently, 
national political leaders will spend a good deal of time trying to ensure 
that the people appointed as judges will exercise power in ways that are 
satisfactory to them.  Second, national political leaders have almost no 
incentive to reach any consensus on merit.  Most citizens pay little or no 
attention to lower court appointments, so leaders can expect little or no 
public backlash against their decisions on lower court appointments.  In 
addition, presidents and senators are reluctant to relinquish their 
institutional prerogatives in the selection process.  When they do so, it is 
only in exchange for something else that they have decided is more 
important to them, at least for the moment.  There is little or no apparent 
political up-side to emphasizing merit, except in defense of embattled 
nominations.  Presidents and senators might sometimes have incentives 
to reach accommodations, but accommodations are much harder to 
come by for presidents and senators from the opposition party.  
Presidents from one party and senators from the other often need 
conflict to sharpen the differences between them and to call attention to 
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the stakes involved in the selection process.  Agreeing on merit would 
merely reduce, rather than preserve or expand, senators’ discretion in 
subsequent confirmation proceedings. 
Perhaps the most intense conflict that Republicans and Democrats 
have had over the past two decades in the selection process has been 
over who occupies the mainstream in constitutional law.  Each side 
claims that its nominees are within the mainstream and the contested 
nominees of the other are not, as evidenced by the struggle over the 
Supreme Court nomination of Robert Bork.19  More recently, 
Democrats have supported six filibusters against judicial nominees 
whose views on constitutional issues are, in their judgment, outside of 
the mainstream.  The defenders argue that just the opposite is true.20 
The contest to define the mainstream has not been merely 
rhetorical.  A good deal is at stake.  Each side desperately wants its 
nominees to be viewed as occupying the middle, rather than the extreme 
end of the spectrum in constitutional law.  The middle is the safest, 
strongest ground.  Moreover, opposing nominees because they are 
outside the mainstream puts the other side on the defensive.  More 
importantly, each side appreciates the enormous stakes involved, for 
with each victory each side advances one step further in building a 
foundation for an enduring constitutional vision.  The vision is 
important in guiding not just other judicial nominations but also the 
exercise of presidential and legislative authority.  The prize is shaping 
constitutional law for at least the foreseeable future. 
Although it is not hard to understand why political leaders care 
intensely about securing the mainstream—or the middle—in 
constitutional law, it is harder for someone outside of, or not invested 
in, the process to determine what counts as the middle.  I consider in the 
next section some of the difficulties with determining the mainstream in 
constitutional law and propose some ways in which to figure out what is 
the mainstream, or middle. 
 
A.     Problems with Defining the Middle in Constitutional Law 
 
There are several major problems with identifying the mid-ground 
in contemporary constitutional law.  First, empirical analysis cannot 
easily capture what counts as the middle because the choices of what to 
 
 19 See generally ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION 
SHOOK AMERICA (1989). 
 20 See Is the Constitutional Option Viable to Break Partisan Filibusters Against Judicial 
Nominees, at http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/legislative_issues/federal_issues/hot_issues_in_congress 
/confirmation_watch/constitutional_option.htm; Sean Grindlay, Judges Deserve a Fair Hearing 
in the Media (Nov. 20, 2003), at http://www.aim.org/briefing_print/99_0_5_0/; James L. 
Swanson, The Coming Battle for the Court, at http://www.cato.org/dailys/04-29-03-2.html. 
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emphasize or count are value-laden.  Anyone looking to define the 
middle, or the mainstream (the two are not necessarily the same) in 
constitutional law must make judgments about relevance: are all cases 
relevant?  Should we only look at the judgments or outcomes in 
particular cases, or should we also look at the reasoning, including its 
quality and extent?  Where, for instance, do seemingly obvious cases 
like Roe v. Wade,21 Lawrence v. Texas,22 and Lee v. Weisman23 fit?  
Some might argue that they are clearly on the “left” in constitutional 
law, but some others might argue they are consistent with a libertarian 
perspective on the right.  Arguing that one or the other of these 
positions is correct is just another value judgment. 
Second, an even bigger problem for defining the middle or the 
mainstream in constitutional law is that the categories we deploy in 
assessing judicial performance as well as the nominees’ views are not 
necessarily fixed.  Because of the phenomenon of ideological drift, 
categories are not static; particular perspectives on constitutional law 
associated with particular political factions may over time be 
appropriated by or become associated with different political factions.24  
For instance, Chief Justice John Marshall reflected a “conservative” 
rather than a “liberal” perspective on constitutional law, because he 
usually favored the status quo.  His successor as Chief Justice of the 
United States, Roger Taney, was understood, at the time of his 
appointment, as representing a “liberal” perspective on constitutional 
law because he was thought to favor progressive legislation and reform 
of the status quo.  It is only because of ideological drift that each is now 
viewed differently.25  New Deal liberals found they had a lot in common 
with the opinions of Chief Justice Marshall, because of their consistent 
support for a strong national government; and conservatives admired 
Taney’s ardent efforts to resist the expansion of the national 
government at the expense of state sovereignty. 
The labels “liberal” and “conservative” do not fit contemporary 
justices much better.  For instance, Justice John Paul Stevens, appointed 
to the Court in 1976 by President Ford, is frequently described as a 
“liberal” by commentators and critics.26  Yet, he hardly seems to have 
much in common with other “liberals” such as Associate Justices 
William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, with whom he sat for many 
 
 21 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 22 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 23 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 24 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric of Judicial Critique: From Judicial Restraint to the 
Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 637-38 (2002). 
 25 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lives of John Marshall, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399 
(2002). 
 26 See John Paul Stevens, at http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article?eu=404877&query= 
john%20ford&ct; http:www.issues2000.org/John_Paul_Stevens.htm. 
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years.  Nor does it seem appropriate to describe Justices Kennedy and 
O’Connor as strictly “conservative” because they have often favored 
protecting state sovereignty in Commerce Clause and Eleventh 
Amendment cases.27  They also have voted to re-affirm the embattled 
decision in Roe v. Wade,28 to strike down all anti-sodomy laws in 
Lawrence v. Texas,29 and to strike down Virginia Military Institute’s 
policy to exclude women.30  It is probably more accurate to describe 
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor as today’s moderates, though many 
senators would resist this label because it cedes the middle ground to 
these justices rather than others they might prefer to place there. 
A third problem with fixing the middle ground in constitutional 
law is that justices sometimes shift their attitudes about constitutional 
law either generally or in particular cases.  Justice Harry Blackmun is 
often described as evolving, or growing, over time into a more “liberal” 
justice.31  Others might move in the other direction.  Spaeth and Segal 
claim, that Justices Stevens and Souter each became more “liberal” over 
time, while Justice White became more “conservative” over time.32  As 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist has sometimes been said to have 
moderated some views,33 as he arguably did in writing the Court’s 
opinions reaffirming Miranda v. Arizona,34 concurring in the Virginia 
Military Institute decision,35 and upholding the Family Leave Act as an 
exercise of Congress’ authority pursuant to Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in Nevada v. Hibbs.36 
A related problem with using the categories of “liberal” and 
“conservative” to describe judicial performance is that judicial 
nominees may not have fixed attitudes about constitutional law.  Some 
people seem to assume that at least some nominees have ideological 
commitments at the times of their nominations that are impervious to 
change, but it seems virtually impossible to prove that this is true 
especially when the nominees themselves disclaim holding any such 
commitments. 
Fifth, legal academics have done little to illuminate what may fall 
 
 27 See Otis H. Stephens, Jr. & John M. Scheb II, American Constitutional Law: Overview of 
the Supreme Court’s 1993 Term, at  http://www.web.utk.edu/~scheb/93term.html (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2005). 
 28  See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 29 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 30 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 31 See Harry Blackmun, at http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article?eu=382716&query= 
houdini%2C%20harry&ct (last visited Jan. 22, 2005); http://www.cnn.com/US/9903/04/black 
mun.02/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2005). 
 32 See SPAETH & SEGAL, supra note 4, at 218. 
 33 See http://www.michaelariens.com/ConLaw/justices/rehnquist.htm. 
 34 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 35 See Virginia, 518 U.S. 515. 
 36 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
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inside or outside the mainstream of constitutional law.  Most legal 
scholars appear interested less in finding common ground than in 
delivering the knock-out punch against opposing points of view.37  A 
common goal of legal scholarship is paradigm-shifting, but in pursuing 
this goal legal scholars will dismiss as wrong or dangerous points of 
view affiliated with the paradigms they are trying to undo.  The pursuit 
of this goal is not likely to enrich our understanding of which views 
actually do rather than ought to fall within the mainstream of American 
constitutional law. 
Sixth, the media hinders sophisticated discussions of judicial 
performance.  The media has begun to shirk its traditional role in 
educating the public.  It has moved from reporting “hard” news or facts 
and figures to reporting “soft” news or speculation and commentary.38  
The proliferation of media outlets and twenty-four hour news has put 
enormous pressure on newspapers and television reporters to emphasize 
scandal.  The media prefers drama and conflict, because it gets people’s 
attention.  The media thus prefers to stick with the simple labels of 
“liberal” and “conservative.”  As candidates and commentators 
increasingly feel the need to characterize opponents in extreme terms, 
the media follows suit.  Candidates are thus “liberal” or “conservative,” 
and Justices are also one or the other.  No one apparently begins as a 
moderate, or ends up as one.  The middle in politics appears to be an 
unoccupied ground that the candidates fight to control, while the media 
simply covers the flashier portions of the fight. 
 
B.     Sketching the Middle 
 
 Assessing ideologies is difficult without having some yardstick 
with which to measure them.  It is possible that the measurement of an 
ideology is a purely normative matter, depending on its appeal to 
lawmakers and its consistency with constitutional law as they 
understand it.  Even then, we need to define the middle, or moderation, 
as a means of curbing reckless or misleading rhetoric.  We need our 
rhetoric to fit the complicated business of judging.  So, the question is 
how accurately can we describe a middle course or the contours of the 
mainstream in constitutional law? 
I offer a few possible answers, taking into account each of the 
 
 37 See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, An Originalist Understanding of Minimalism, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 
175 (1993); Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever By Half: The Problem with Novelty in Constitutional 
Law, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 921 (2001). 
 38 See MARVIN KALB, ONE SCANDALOUS STORY: CLINTON, LEWINSKY AND THIRTEEN 
DAYS THAT TARNISHED AMERICAN JOURNALISM (2001); BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, 
WARP SPEED: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF THE MIXED MEDIA (1999). 
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difficulties described above.  First, we can identify the middle ground as 
what each of the contending sides in confirmation contests seeks to 
occupy.  We can thus define it at least as an aspiration.  We can assess 
nominees based on how well they fit the description of the middle 
ground, or mainstream, of their supporters.  One problem with this 
definition is that it might allow one side to define the terms on which it 
prefers for its nominees to be assessed, without any second-guessing; 
however, this understanding of the mainstream puts pressure on 
supporters to be careful about how they characterize nominees or risk 
having them fail to meet expectations. 
A second possibility is to define the mainstream as the pool of 
people who have made it successfully through the confirmation process.  
They constitute a large and diverse pool, which reflects the approval of 
the governing elite.  The problem with this understanding of the 
mainstream is that it fails to take into account the facts that many people 
make it through the process without close scrutiny and that presidents 
and senators have not agreed with everything decided by the judges 
whom they have approved. 
Moreover, defining the mainstream as those whom the Senate has 
confirmed merely gives each side an incentive to push the envelope.  
With each victory in the confirmation process, each party has expanded 
the possibilities for its nominees.  Once people are confirmed, their 
parties can point to them as examples, or precedents, to guide future 
confirmation proceedings. 
A more interesting but speculative test might be to ask whether the 
President would still nominate, or the Senate still approve, the same 
judges if they knew what kinds of decisions they would make.  In many 
cases, nominees are relatively blank slates, and judges and justices 
presumably fulfill special obligations independent from presidential and 
senatorial influence.  So, it might not be fair to attribute to presidents 
and senators all the decisions made by the judges and justices they have 
approved. 
Third, the mainstream could be understood as simply consisting of 
the views of those at the center of the Court.  Today that would 
presumably mean Justice O’Connor, because she almost never dissented 
in the October 2003 Term.39  The problem is that she did not decide 
these cases alone, and it is unclear why those with whom she joined in 
majority opinions ought to be excluded from the mainstream.  
Moreover, the center can shift, and there is no guarantee that she will be 
there as often next year.  Nor is it clear why dissenters ought to be 
excluded entirely, because dissents sometimes later become the law. 
The fourth and final possibility is to define the mainstream as 
 
 39 See Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost His Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 
2004, at A1. 
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something more dynamic and broader than a specific Court or specific 
Justice at a particular moment in time.  For one thing, the Court is not 
alone in making constitutional law.  Our political leaders make a great 
deal of constitutional law, much of which eludes judicial review.40  
Moreover, the Court approves the vast majority of the constitutional 
decisions that it does review.  It would also be wrong to assume that 
every Court decision reflects mainstream constitutional values.  
Sometimes the Court gets it wrong, as it did in Chisholm v. Georgia,41 
Dred Scott v. Sanford,42 and Korematsu v. United States.43  The 
constitutional views of presidents and senators are relevant to the 
makeup of the mainstream, because they have the power to try to move 
the Court in different directions or perhaps keep it on course by virtue 
of their respective authority in the appointments process.  They also 
have the power to shape enduring policies.  Consequently, it is possible 
to define the mainstream as the dominant doctrine, outlook, and 
thinking on constitutional law over time.  The Supreme Court provides 
the doctrine, the courts and national political leaders shape the outlook 
of an era, and all of these along with constitutional commentators in a 
wide variety of fora inform the thinking on constitutional law.  This 
perspective on the mainstream has the virtue of encapsulating the 
constitutional activities of a given era.  The main problem with this 
perspective is that there is no method on which all people could agree 
for determining the relevant doctrine, outlook, and thinking of a 
particular era.  Historians might be in the best position to give us this 
information but only in retrospect.  It is a challenge, to say the least, for 
someone to step outside of his or own time to develop a credible 
perspective on it. 
 
III.     PROVING IDEOLOGY MATTERS 
 
Proving what many people suppose—that ideology matters more 
than anything else to most presidents in nominating judges and most 
senators in voting on their confirmation—is no small feat.  There are a 
number of complications with determining the extent to which ideology 
was a major factor or the primary basis for the President’s nominating 
and the Senate’s voting on the confirmation of various judicial 
nominees.  After briefly reviewing these, I make some modest 
suggestions for future empirical analysis on the significance of ideology 
 
 40 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitution Outside the Court, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 775 
(2003). 
 41 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
 42 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 43 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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in the judicial selection process. 
A.     Ideology’s Elusiveness 
 
There are a number of problems with proving empirically whether 
and, if so, how much ideology was a factor in the nominating or 
confirmation phase.  First, reaching consensus on what qualifies as 
ideology is difficult.  Although I understand ideology as a pre-
commitment to certain constitutional values or to resolving particular 
questions of constitutional law regardless of the facts of particular cases, 
this is but one understanding.44 
The second problem is that not every judicial nominee has a well-
conceived or thoroughly worked-out constitutional ideology.  Indeed, 
judicial nominees often publicly disavow commitment to a particular 
constitutional ideology.  Moreover, ideology presumably functions as a 
blinding mechanism, so that it is conceivable that some nominees may 
not be aware that they have certain ideological commitments. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the relevance of ideology to 
particular judges’ decisions or to particular confirmation decisions may 
not be evident in the public record.  If the President and his nominees 
deny that they have particular ideological commitments, then the burden 
shifts to the other side to prove them wrong.  This is precisely the 
dynamic with President Bush’s judicial nominees.  He has publicly 
defended his nominations on the ground of merit, and disavowed that he 
has employed a litmus test or chosen nominees based on particular 
ideological commitments.45  His nominees publicly disavow such 
commitments.46  Consequently, skeptical Democrats must infer his 
selection criteria—including any preference for ideological pre-
commitments—from the kinds of nominees that he has chosen. 
Moreover, most judicial nominations fail because of inaction.  For 
instance, the Senate in President Clinton’s final year in office failed to 
act on more than sixty of his judicial nominations.  There is little or no 
record on these nominees, so it is not possible to prove precisely why 
the Judiciary Committee did not hold hearings or votes on these 
nominees. 
In addition, Senate debates over nominees rarely employ the term 
“ideology.”  More often than not, the focus in confirmation contests has 
been on such matters as the nominee’s integrity, experience, 
 
 44 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2 (statement of Orrin G. Hatch) (characterizing ideology as 
distinctly outside of the realm of judicial decision-making as envisioned in the Constitution). 
 45 See Joyce Purnick, Ideology? Well, Who’s to Judge, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2001, at B1. 
 46 See Raymond Hernandez, An Infuriating Success: Schumer Draws Fire for Tactics 
Blocking Judicial Nominations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2003, at B1. 
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competence, and temperament.47  When the debates do shift focus to 
nominees’ commitments to, or expression of, particular constitutional 
views, they feature discussions about whether the nominee comes from 
the “mainstream” of constitutional law. 
Fourth, proving ideology matters to nominations or confirmation 
decisions is complicated by the fact that these decisions are invariably 
based on multiple factors.  Presidents, or their counselors, usually 
employ a range of criteria for making decisions on whom to nominate.48  
In the Senate, a single factor is not usually determinative, because 
different senators base their decisions on different factors.  Nor is it 
unusual for presidents and senators to base public decisions on factors 
they do not disclose.  It is not incumbent upon them to disclose all the 
grounds for their constitutional decisions. 
Moreover, presidents and senators must make different kinds of 
decisions in the selection process.  Because presidents are responsible 
for choosing nominees, they can make decisions about which persons 
they think are best qualified or best fit their selection criteria.  Senators 
are often able to provide input and even make specific 
recommendations on nominations, but their primary responsibility is to 
determine not necessarily whether the nominee is ideal or the best 
qualified but rather acceptable according to whatever criteria each 
senator decides is relevant.  It is thus not unthinkable that one-hundred 
different senators may use one-hundred different sets of criteria for 
evaluating judicial nominees. 
 
B.     How to Show Ideology Matters 
 
The aforementioned problems are not necessarily fatal to the 
enterprise of proving that ideology makes a difference to outcomes in 
the confirmation process.  Patterns invariably emerge within the 
process.  For instance, the Senate usually approves the vast majority of 
a president’s judicial nominations.  One could try to identify what the 
nominees who have made it through the process successfully have in 
common or what traits or characteristics are shared by those who have 
been unsuccessful.  These are not necessarily easy ventures, but they are 
not impossible.  For instance, social scientists such as David Yalof have 
shown what they regard as the characteristics that the people nominated 
to the Supreme Court over the past few decades have had in common.49 
 
 47 See Kenneth B. Noble, Hatch Assails A.B.A. Over Vote on Bork, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 
1987, at A14. 
 48 See DAVID YALOF, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE 
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999). 
 49 See id.; Lee Epstein, et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and its Consequences 
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Once one sets out to demonstrate the particular significance of a 
single factor, such as ideology, the task becomes somewhat more 
complicated.  To make this showing, one needs, at the outset, to 
determine the relevant independent and dependent variables.50  The 
variable that is to be explained—in the case of the confirmation process, 
the vote share, or how senators voted on particular nominations, or the 
absence of a vote on a particular nomination—is the dependent variable; 
it “depends” or turns on other variables.  The latter are what social 
scientists call independent or “explanatory” variables, because they help 
to explain the dependent variable.  The independent or explanatory 
variables are not themselves explained by the theory one is trying to 
prove; they simply do the explaining.  My purpose is to clarify that, as 
an empirical matter, ideology is not the outcome that needs to be 
proved; instead, it is one of the variables that determines outcomes in 
the confirmation process.  Thus, we need to determine, even before we 
can prove the hypothesis or theory underlying much of the discussion in 
this symposium—that ideology matters significantly in the confirmation 
process—what proxies stand for ideology and what other variables are 
potentially relevant to outcomes in the confirmation process. 
One cannot prove that ideology matters without initially 
determining how ideology manifests itself.  The most obvious 
possibilities are statements and actions of nominees that accord with, or 
explicitly embrace, particular ideologies.  If the nominees have been 
judges, then their opinions might reflect ideologies or perhaps the 
absence of them.  In addition, they might have given speeches, written 
articles or books, or made statements that reflect ideological 
commitments or their absence.  If the nominees have not been judges, 
then their activities in the public or private sectors might reflect their 
commitments to certain ideologies, though these can be disavowed as 
merely doing the bidding of superiors or clients.  More relevant for 
people who have yet been judges are writings, speeches, or statements.  
Also relevant may be the testimony and the support of those claiming to 
know the nominees best.  Put slightly differently, one might ask which 
groups support nominees and why or on what bases.  But people who 
are not judges, even if they are academics, can credibly claim that their 
public musings do not reflect what they would do as judges because 
their duties as judges require them to do things, such as following 
precedent, that they are not required to accept as scholars or 
commentators. 
It is easier to settle on the independent variables other than 
ideology.  The first is Senate composition.  Presidents often take the 
 
for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903 (2003). 
 50 For an excellent primer on statistical analysis, see RAY C. FAIR, PREDICTING 
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composition of the Senate into account in deciding on whom to 
nominate and when.  The strength of a president’s party’s representation 
in the Senate is obviously important, because it determines which 
parties control the Judiciary Committee, the agenda on the floor of the 
Senate, and the length of debate.  If the minority party controls at least 
forty seats in the Senate, it can then block some judicial nominations by 
filibustering them.51  Threatening filibusters or holds, which are, in 
effect mini-filibusters, can sometimes influence whether and when 
presidents make certain nominations. 
A second factor is timing.  Election years tend not to be good times 
for presidents to make judicial nominations, particularly to the Supreme 
Court.  In the nineteenth century, the Senate did not act on at least nine 
Supreme Court nominations, supposedly because the majority party was 
trying to keep the vacancies open until after the next presidential 
election.52  In President Clinton’s final year in office, the Senate did not 
act on more than sixty of his judicial nominations.53  Similarly, the 
Democratically-led Senate did not act on dozens of the first President 
Bush’s judicial nominations in his final year in office, presumably 
because of a desire to keep as many judicial vacancies for the next 
President.54 
Timing might matter in a different way.  Most failed nominations 
do not get so far as receiving Committee votes; they fail because of 
inaction.  Moreover, not all nominations that get hearings are scheduled 
for Committee votes.  Consequently, one needs to figure out how long a 
nomination has gone without a hearing or whether it has gotten a 
Committee vote within a certain period of time, presumably the average 
length of a time between a nomination and a Committee vote.  Those 
nominations exceeding the average length of time without yet getting a 
hearing or Committee vote are unlikely to be approved. 
Third, sponsoring senators may make a difference to the fate of at 
least some judicial nominations.  The more powerful the senator, the 
more likely it is that nominees he has supported will be confirmed.  For 
instance, the Senate has confirmed a number of nominees who worked 
for Senator Hatch.55  Indeed, Senator Hatch convinced President Clinton 
to nominate a former aide to a District Court in Utah, after he had held 
up every other judicial nomination pending President Clinton’s 
compliance.56  It also possible that sponsoring senators might signal 
 
 51 See SEN. R. XXII, available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/senaterules/rule22.htm. 
 52 See ABRAHAM, supra note 15. 
 53 See Republicans Create Judicial Vacancy Crises, Then Blame Democrats, at 
http://democrats.senate.gov/~dpc/pubs/107-2-75.html. 
 54 See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM 
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997). 
 55 Jonathan Groner, The Judge Maker, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 19, 2002, at 1. 
 56 See GERHARDT, supra note 10. 
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nominees’ possible commitments to particular ideologies, if the senators 
are well known or can be shown to prefer nominees with such 
commitments. 
Fourth, a president’s popularity might have an effect on a 
nomination’s fate.  The President’s political strength, as reflected in his 
approval ratings with the public, might show the risks involved in a 
fight with the President.  The more closely a nomination is identified 
with the President or the more it means to him or his policies, the more 
likely that the popularity of the president or his policies will be an 
important factor.  The more popular the president or the policies with 
which the nominee is associated, the more likely it is that this popularity 
will benefit his nomination.  The more political coinage that a president 
has on which to draw in confirmation contests, the more likely it is that 
senators will suffer some political damage or loss from such 
confrontations.  Some senators might choose contests over some 
judicial nominations because they believe the conflicts can improve 
their standing with important constituencies or can underscore their own 
political commitments.  But contests are not likely to be completely 
cost-free, particularly insofar as the presidents remember them and have 
the means and opportunity to seek retaliation. 
A related factor may be party cohesion or fidelity.  The extent to 
which senators from the same party are willing to stand together on 
judicial nominations makes a big difference as to whether they can 
successfully filibuster or defeat nominations in Committee or on the 
Senate floor.  The degree of cohesion or unity within a caucus is 
pertinent to how much power it can wield under the Senate rules to 
strike deals with the President.  Sometimes senators do not do what their 
party leaders or presidents from their parties tell them to do.  Sometimes 
divisions in the ranks of the senators from the President’s party can be a 
problem for many nominees, with some joining together with members 
of the opposition party to defeat them. 
The sixth factor is whether the blue-slip process is in place at time 
of a nomination.57  The blue-slip process allows a senator to block a 
nomination made to an office in that senator’s home state.  This process 
is usually available to senators from both parties, but sometimes 
presidents or Senate leaders have restricted it to senators only from the 
president’s party.  If this process is in place in whatever form, it 
expands senators’ opportunities to block nominations.  It particularly 
reinforces the strength of the majority party in the Senate.  If that party 
is targeting the expression of support for particular policies or 
ideologies, then nominees who can be shown to have made such 
expressions face potentially serious obstacles to their confirmation from 
 
 57 On the blue-slip process, see generally Brannon Denning, The Blue Slip: Enforcing the 
Norms of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2001). 
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the beginning. 
Seventh, the number of witnesses called for and against 
nominations is likely to be pertinent to their chances to succeed in the 
confirmation process.  The number of people testifying, particularly 
against a nomination, is likely to signal some problem with the 
nomination.  Of course, numbers alone do not indicate the reasons for 
support or opposition.  Some people may be opposed because of their 
supposed ideological commitments, but one must go behind these 
numbers in order to determine this information. 
Eighth, the American Bar Association’s ratings on nominees may 
affect the fate of nominations.  Positive ratings do not guarantee 
confirmation, but negative or largely unfavorable ratings are bound to 
lower considerably a nominee’s chances for confirmation.  Even split 
ratings can be problematic, though not necessarily fatal.  The American 
Bar Association comes as close as any group to providing a “neutral” 
assessment of a nominee’s qualifications, and its ratings may be used by 
either side in a confirmation contest depending on the extent to which 
they are favorable or unfavorable. 
These are just eight factors, besides ideology, that are likely to 
affect the fate of judicial nominations.  The odds are that nominations 
will not falter simply because of one of these factors.  Moreover, it is 
possible, if not likely, that the stated grounds of opposition to judicial 
nominations might not be entirely credible; they might reflect, at least to 
some extent, a pretext to oppose a nomination.  For instance, the 
Judiciary Committee never acted on President Clinton’s nomination of 
Elena Kagan to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
in 2000.  She never got a hearing, much less a vote, on her nomination, 
in spite of her strong credentials.  Indeed, she is now the Dean of 
Harvard Law School.  No one expressed opposition to her because of 
her ideology.  Instead, opposition, to the extent it was ever manifest in 
public, focused more on whether the appellate court to which she had 
been nominated had a caseload to justify filling all of the seats to which 
the President had nominated people.58  Some people might view this 
opposition as merely a pretext to preclude the confirmation of someone 
whom the opposition party feared might be a liberal activist or who 
would then occupy a seat that it would have preferred for one of its own 
to occupy.  After President Bush took office, Republican leaders 
changed position and acknowledged the court’s caseload justified filling 
all its seats.59  And President Bush then nominated Miguel Estrada to 
one of them.  It is possible that at least some opposition to the Estrada 
 
 58 See http://www.independentjudiciary.com/courts/courtlong/cfm?CourtID=18 (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2005). 
 59 Neil A. Lewis, Party Leasers Clash in Capitol Over Pace of Filling Judgeships, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 10, 2002, at A1. 
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nomination derived in part from a desire for payback, though the 
grounds cited by opponents related to Estrada’s temperament and 
imputed judicial ideology.  Although payback is another possible factor 
that needs to be monitored in the confirmation process, it is hard to 
verify, because senators rarely acknowledge that it is the basis for their 
opposition. 
In the final analysis, proving that ideology significantly affects the 
fate of nominations is not easy.  Proving it may be so difficult that many 
people simply opt for anecdotal evidence or merely analyzing the 
appeal of a particular nominee’s ideology.  After all, it is not necessary 
to prove that all nominees shared commitments to problematic 
ideologies but rather only the ones that senators end up choosing to 
oppose for stated or unstated reasons.  The higher, or more powerful, 
the court to which someone has been nominated, the more likely 
senators will be concerned about the person’s likely judicial ideology.  
In any event, as long as senators do not fear the President, senators 
remain relatively free to pick and choose which nominees to oppose and 




I close with a challenge.  I challenge others to talk more openly 
about merit in judicial selection and particularly whether merit can be 
defined separately from ideology.  If it can, then we have to wonder 
why more scholars, presidents, and senators do not separately define 
these concepts.  If not, then we need to explain why we should not 
simply join forces with the many social scientists who believe that 
judges are simply policymakers who wear robes. 
